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T IS AN UNFORTUNATELY FAMILIAR FACT that intoxication can 
lead people to act improperly, even criminally. Consider Elie Joseph Ar-
senault.1 In June 1954, Arsenault shot and killed Harriet Hinckley, his 
drinking partner and intimate. The murder occurred at the end of a days-long 
drinking binge, after Arsenault and Hinckley had shared 11 pints of liquor 
accompanied by barbiturates. Arsenault remembered little – not shooting 
Hinckley, not telephoning the police, not confessing to the crime. 
Incapacitated wrongdoers like Arsenault pose a problem for reasons-
responsiveness accounts of moral responsibility. Those accounts are power-
ful and popular – it seems right that moral responsibility depends upon an 
agent’s having the capacities to perceive and act upon moral reasons. But, 
while Arsenault’s intoxication likely incapacitated him at the time of his 
crime, surely he should not be excused from blame. In order to address such 
cases, many reasons-responsiveness advocates include a tracing condition to 
supplement the ordinary conditions of responsibility. The intoxicated 
wrongdoer is blameworthy despite his incapacitation precisely because he is 
responsible for becoming incapacitated. We hold him responsible for his in-
toxicated wrongdoing by tracing back to his responsibility for becoming in-
toxicated. Arsenault was responsible for becoming intoxicated, and his re-
sponsibility for the later murder of Hinckley can be traced back to that earlier 
responsibility. 
But not everyone has accepted tracing. One challenge notes that we do 
not need tracing to blame culpably incapacitated agents. We can hold these 
agents accountable for their behavior in becoming incapacitated and for the 
foreseeable consequences of that behavior, and we can do so without taking 
on the apparent costs of tracing. I go further – I claim that tracing gets things 
wrong. To show this, I consider a different sort of case: the Odysseus case. 
Odysseus incapacitated himself in order to sail safely past the Sirens. Arse-
nault’s incapacity was improper; Odysseus’ was not. And had things worked 
out poorly for Odysseus, had his incapacity led to some later wrongdoing, he 
would have been unlucky but not blameworthy. The core reasons-
responsiveness account agrees, but tracing accounts expose unlucky Odys-
seus agents to blame. Since reasons-responsiveness responsibility appears to 
get us what we want (as urged by the first challenge) and tracing gets us ver-
dicts that we do not want (as shown by my new challenge), we should reject 
tracing. 
1 State v. Arsenault, 152 Me. 121, 124 A.2d 741 (Maine 1956). 
I 
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1. Ordinary Responsibility and the Motivation for Tracing 
 
1.1 
 
Tracing is often offered as a supplement to reasons-responsiveness accounts 
of moral responsibility. Following Gary Watson (1996), we can distinguish 
between two sorts of responsibility: attributability and accountability. When 
we hold someone responsible for some action in the attributability sense of 
responsibility, we make an aretaic judgment about them on the basis of their 
behavior. But here we are interested in responsibility as accountability. When 
we hold someone responsible for some action in the accountability sense, we 
are disposed to react to them in certain ways, in particular with blame or 
punishment for improper behavior. 2  Reasons-responsiveness accounts of 
responsibility are offered to explain the conditions of this accountability sort 
of responsibility. 
Reasons-responsiveness accounts associate accountability with the abil-
ity to respond in the right way to moral reasons. Many reasons-
responsiveness theorists then identify the ability to respond in the right way 
to moral reasons with two normative capacities: the cognitive capacity to dis-
cern moral reasons and the volitional capacity to act upon moral reasons.3 
While there is significant disagreement regarding exactly how to pick out the 
two capacities, the reasons-responsiveness theorists ground responsibility 
largely (or wholly) on the possession of these two normative capacities. 
The reasons-responsiveness account fits well with thinking of respon-
sibility as grounded in concerns about fairness. R. Jay Wallace (1994) picks 
out the conditions of blameworthiness by looking at when it would be fair to 
expect others to heed moral reasons, and David Brink and Dana Kay Nelkin !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 There is an important ambiguity in philosophers’ use of the notion of accountability. For 
many philosophers, to be accountable for some wrong is to be at fault and culpable for the 
wrong such that resentment and indignation are appropriate. For other philosophers, to be 
accountable for some (apparent) wrong is to bear a relationship to the behavior such that it 
is appropriate for others to demand an explanation. Only if some suitable explanation (such 
as a justification or an excuse) is not forthcoming would resentment and indignation be ap-
propriate. In both cases, the agent is treated as an accountable agent, an agent upon whom it 
is generally appropriate to place moral demands. But the two notions of accountability are 
distinct. On the first sense of accountability, an agent who is excused for some bit of wrong-
doing is therefore not accountable for that wrongdoing; on the latter sense, the agent is ex-
cused for the wrongdoing as part of the process of holding the agent accountable for the 
wrongdoing. In this essay, I follow those philosophers who use accountability in the first 
sense. I thank an anonymous referee for highlighting this distinction. 
3 For John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998), for instance, an agent is reasons-
responsive, and thus is responsible, when the agent is both reasons-receptive and reasons-
reactive. For R. Jay Wallace (1994), an agent has the power of reflective self-control, and 
thus is responsible, when the agent has the power to grasp and apply moral reasons as well 
as the power to control his behavior in light of those reasons. And on Dana Kay Nelkin’s 
(2011) rational-abilities view, an agent is responsible when the agent acts with the powers to 
recognize and act for good reasons. 
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(2013) pick out responsibility by considering the importance of the fair op-
portunity to avoid wrongdoing. Thinking of fairness can explain why we 
think that insanity excuses, why we think that duress sometimes excuses and 
sometimes mitigates, and the like. An agent who lacked the capacities to re-
spond to the moral reasons at hand could not fairly be expected to respond 
to those moral reasons. But, for agents who are sensitive in the right way to 
moral reasons, it seems fair to demand that they take account of those moral 
reasons, and it seems fair to hold them responsible when they fail to do so.  
A basic reasons-responsiveness account of responsibility claims that 
reasons-responsiveness is at least necessary (and maybe also sufficient) for 
moral responsibility. I will call such an account the ordinary-responsibility account. 
On an ordinary-responsibility account, an agent is responsible for a wrong-
doing only if, when the agent committed the wrongdoing, the agent was able 
to discern and act upon the reasons that counted against committing the 
wrong. That is, responsibility requires that the ordinary conditions of rea-
sons-responsiveness be met at the time of the wrongdoing. And, at least in 
the typical cases, reasons-responsiveness is also sufficient for responsibility.4 
If the agent could have understood that the action was wrong, and if the 
agent could have acted upon that understanding, then the agent is responsi-
ble for failing to do so.  
On the ordinary-responsibility account, an agent’s responsibility for 
some bit of wrongdoing depends upon facts about the agent at the time of 
the wrongdoing. If the agent was reasons-responsive at the time of the 
wrongdoing, then the agent is responsible for the wrongdoing, and if the 
agent was not reasons-responsive at the time of the wrongdoing, then the 
agent is not responsible for the wrongdoing. Of course, that the agent’s his-
tory does not matter for questions of responsibility for wrongdoing does not 
entail that the agent’s history does not bear on any aspect of the agent’s re-
sponsibility. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza’s (1998) account of re-
sponsibility for consequences, for instance, is historicist. To determine 
whether an agent is responsible for some consequence, we must consider 
whether the agent had the requisite sort of control at some relevant point 
prior to the consequence. To be fully developed, the ordinary-responsibility 
account should have something to say about the conditions of responsibility 
for the consequences of one’s actions, including cases in which one of the 
consequences of an action is some further wrongdoing. I will return to ques-
tions about responsibility for consequences later. But, while the broader ac-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 I have qualified the claim that reasons-responsiveness is seen as sufficient for responsibility. 
Some reasons-responsiveness theorists are inclined to add a further condition that the 
agent’s character have the right sort of history (or at least not have the wrong sort of histo-
ry). Such a further condition is often offered to address questions about manipulated agents 
and agents with a rotten social background. Fischer and Ravizza, for instance, require that an 
agent have taken ownership for the psychological mechanism upon which she acts. Because 
conditions like the taking-ownership constraint do not bear on the tracing question, I set 
them aside. 
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count of responsibility might be mixed, the ordinary-responsibility account’s 
treatment of responsibility for wrongdoing is ahistorical.5 
 
1.2 
 
But many reasons-responsiveness theorists deny that responsibility for 
wrongdoing is an ahistorical evaluation. Fischer and Ravizza, for instance, 
consider Max, a drunk driver. Max drinks so much that he is “almost oblivi-
ous to his surroundings” (1998: 49). Intoxicated, he attempts to drive home 
and, unfortunately, strikes and kills a child in a crosswalk. By assumption, 
Max’s intoxication left him non-reasons-responsive, both when he decided to 
drive and when he struck and killed the child. This suggests that Max might 
be excused under the ordinary-responsibility account’s ahistorical analysis of 
responsibility. Nonetheless, intuitively, he is to blame. Cases like Max’s sug-
gest that ordinary responsibility is explanatorily inadequate. 
Fischer and Ravizza explain that drunk drivers like Max are responsible 
for their intoxicated behavior because they are responsible for becoming in-
toxicated. Fischer and Ravizza hold culpably incapacitated agents responsible 
for their culpably incapacitated wrongdoing by tracing responsibility for the 
wrongdoing back to responsibility for the prior behavior that led to the inca-
pacity. As they explain: 
 
When one acts from a reasons-responsive mechanism at time T1, and one 
can reasonably be expected to know that so acting will (or may) lead to act-
ing from an unresponsive mechanism at some later time T2, one can be held 
responsible for so acting at T2 (50). 
 
Tracing allows us to hold an incapacitated agent responsible for her wrong-
doing so long as there was some prior moment when the agent could act to 
avoid her incapacitation and could reasonably foresee her subsequent inca-
pacity and wrongdoing. 
Tracing offers to address the explanatory inadequacy that appeared to 
threaten ordinary responsibility. Return to Max, Fischer and Ravizza’s drunk 
driver. By hypothesis, Max was not incapacitated at the time he was drinking, 
and he could reasonably have been expected to know that drinking to excess 
could lead him to act wrongly while incapacitated.6 When he did later drive 
while intoxicated to the point of incapacity, we ground responsibility for the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 The ordinary-responsibility account is not the only ahistorical account of responsibility. For 
example, “mesh” theories of responsibility claim that an agent is responsible so long as there 
is the right sort of mesh between an agent’s preferences or desires and her action. Many take 
mesh theories to be ahistorical. Harry Frankfurt, for instance, explains that “the questions of 
how the actions and his identifications with their springs are caused is irrelevant to the ques-
tions of whether he performs the actions freely or is morally responsible for performing 
them” (1975: 122). 
6 In Fischer and Ravizza’s mechanism-specific terminology, we would say that Max’s drink-
ing was the product of a reasons-responsive psychological mechanism. 
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intoxicated driving by tracing back to his responsibility for drinking to the 
point of intoxication. 
In addition to appearing to explain our intuitions about culpable-
incapacity cases, tracing tracks the way courts have regarded intoxication as a 
defense. The Model Penal Code, prepared as an advisory guide for legisla-
tures and courts, provides an affirmative defense to defendants whose intoxi-
cation interferes with their cognitive or volitional normative capacities, but it 
allows this defense only when the intoxication was not self-induced.7 Apply-
ing similar reasoning, the Supreme Court of Minnesota addressed the re-
sponsibility of a hit-and-run driver who claimed to have been unwittingly in-
capacitated by his prescribed medicine.8 The court ruled that the medicated 
defendant could be excused from responsibility if two conditions had been 
met: (a) the medication caused him to be temporarily insane and (b) he nei-
ther had known nor had good reason to know that it would have this effect. 
If, that is, the medication’s effect had caught the defendant unaware, then his 
incapacity would be considered involuntary, and the medication could 
ground an affirmative defense. But if the defendant had been aware of the 
risk of intoxication and so been responsible for becoming incapacitated, then 
the medication’s effect would provide no defense. 
We might worry about the reasonable-expectation element of the trac-
ing scheme. Tracing’s extension of responsibility is usually constrained by 
foreseeability. We see this in Fischer and Ravizza’s tracing scheme, for in-
stance. As Manuel Vargas (2005) objects, this constraint robs tracing of much 
of its explanatory promise, since many of the cases in which tracing might 
seem to help are cases in which the later wrongdoing was not foreseeable at 
the time the agent constrained her own agency. For instance, Vargas de-
scribes a manager who, as a teenager, purposefully inculcates a cool but jerky 
persona, and later, acting on the jerky persona, unreflectively mistreats a 
number of employees. Vargas denies that we can appeal to tracing to hold 
the manager responsible because he denies that the mistreatment was fore-
seeable when the manager was a teenager. 
What about the more standard tracing cases? Is vehicular homicide a 
foreseeable risk of social drinking? Fischer and Neal Tognazzini write that 
“Drunk-driving cases are unproblematic precisely because everyone knows !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Section 2.08(4). We should distinguish two sorts of defenses available at law: elemental 
defenses and affirmative defenses. An elemental defense contends that one of the crime’s 
constitutive elements is missing; it denies that the defendant has committed the crime. An 
affirmative defense, by contrast, does not dispute that the crime was committed, but it de-
nies that the defendant should be held accountable for the crime. It is not controversial that 
intoxication, self-induced or otherwise, can ground an elemental defense. Consider burglary: 
A defendant commits burglary by breaking into a building with the intent to commit some 
further crime. If a defendant is so intoxicated that he cannot form the intent to commit 
some further crime, then no burglary has been committed (though the defendant may be 
guilty of trespass). However, the tracing question arises when we consider the conditions of 
responsibility, and denials of responsibility constitute affirmative defenses. 
8 State v. Altimus, 306 Minn. 462, 238 N.W.2d 851 (Minn. 1976). 
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(or at least should know) that too much alcohol will impair the ability to drive 
a car” (2009: 532). But its being foreseeable that the agent might become too 
intoxicated to drive safely is not the same as its being foreseeable that the 
agent might nonetheless attempt to drive. Fischer and Tognazzini further 
explain that the foreseeability constraint does not require that you know what 
your wrongdoing will be “in all its florid particularity,” and so I here grant 
tracing advocates the assumption that the agent’s later, untoward behavior 
was foreseeable at the earlier time, at least in the central culpable-incapacity 
cases that motivate the addition of tracing.9 
We also should be careful about the cases we are considering. Fischer 
and Ravizza’s Max is supposed to be wholly incapacitated, rendered func-
tionally insane. However, many of the culpably incapacitated agents we actu-
ally confront are only partially incapacitated. As Douglas Husak (2012) ex-
plains, the capacities to reason will often be impaired by intoxication but 
rarely destroyed. If the typical drunk driver is only partially incapacitated, 
then the typical drunk driver remains partially reasons-responsive. And be-
cause drunk drivers are often partially reasons-responsive at the time they 
drive drunk, they are partially responsible for their drunk driving as wrongdo-
ing even without tracing. If we are not careful, our intuitions about the rare 
fully incapacitated drunk driver could be influenced by our experiences with 
much more common partially incapacitated drunk drivers. But I will assume 
due care in this regard. 
I will call the account of reasons-responsiveness responsibility supple-
mented by tracing the tracing account, noting that the tracing account includes 
both traced responsibility and ordinary responsibility. 
 
1.3 
 
Tracing skeptics like Matt King (2014), Andrew Khoury (2012), and Larry 
Alexander (2013) argue that the ordinary-responsibility account can account 
for cases such as Fischer and Ravizza’s drunk driver even without tracing. As 
King explains, becoming intoxicated to the point of incapacity creates risk, 
and often that risk is unwarranted. When an agent creates an unwarranted 
risk, the agent is reckless if he is aware of the risk, and he is negligent if he is 
not aware of the risk but should be. It is a familiar feature of ordinary re-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 This debate continues in the literature. Fischer and Tognazzini (2011a) have since offered a 
revised version of their 2009 paper, again contending that, for each of Vargas’s cases, either 
the agent could have foreseen the wrongdoing in the right sort of way or the agent should 
not be held responsible. Kevin Timpe (2011) makes a similar argument, claiming that we can 
defuse Vargas’s cases by getting a more precise grasp on the epistemic condition of respon-
sibility. Seth Shabo (2015) has recently offered a further argument in this thread, pointing to 
cases in which responsibility seems to outpace foreseeability. If tracing requires foreseeability 
as Fischer and Ravizza suggest, then the cases offered by Vargas and Shabo should give us 
concern about just how much explanatory power tracing can offer. However, because the 
Odysseus cases provide independent grounds for rejecting tracing, I leave the foreseeability 
worries aside. 
JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 10, NO. 1 
RESISTING TRACING’S SIREN SONG 
Craig K. Agule 
! 7 
sponsibility that we hold agents responsible for their reckless or negligent 
conduct and for the foreseeable consequences of that conduct, and so we can 
hold the culpably incapacitated agents responsible for their reckless or negli-
gent conduct in becoming incapacitated as well as for the foreseeable conse-
quences of their recklessness or negligence. We can hold drunk drivers re-
sponsible for acting improperly and for the foreseeable consequences of that 
improper action without needing tracing, and so ordinary responsibility can 
avoid the explanatory-inadequacy worry.10 
But tracing’s advocates have insisted that ordinary responsibility is not 
sufficient. Kevin Timpe contends that “it is hard to see ... how one could ac-
count for a drunk driver’s being responsible for running over a pedestrian 
without a tracing clause” (2011: 12). According to Fischer and Ravizza, trac-
ing is a “refinement” developed to address a “problem” for their reasons-
responsiveness theory of responsibility (1998: 49). And Fischer later writes 
with Tognazzini that tracing was a “component [that] must be added to get a 
plausible theory of moral responsibility” (2009: 532; emphasis added). For 
tracing’s advocates, tracing is a necessary addition to the theory of responsi-
bility. Merely being responsible for the foreseeable consequences of some 
prior action is not sufficient. 
To defend this position, the tracing advocate needs to show both that 
tracing makes a difference and that we should want our theory of responsibil-
ity to include that difference. In the rest of this paper, however, I will argue 
that tracing’s advocates cannot achieve both of these goals. On the most 
plausible understanding of the sort of difference tracing might make, it is a 
difference we should reject. 
 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 King also suggests that tracing brings complications we can avoid if we reject tracing, cit-
ing Michael McKenna (2008), George Sher (2009), Angela Smith (2008), and Vargas (2005). 
If foreseeability constrains responsibility, how plausible is it that the ultimate wrongdoing is 
foreseeable before the agent has become incompetent in the tracing cases? And what about 
tracing cases in which the agent has incapacitated himself thoughtlessly? Is it reasonable to 
hold the agent accountable for that oversight even if the agent was never cognizant of the 
possibility of precaution? But concerns like these cannot tell against tracing. At best, they 
serve to delimit the scope of tracing to cases in which the ultimate wrongdoing was foresee-
able or perhaps even foreseen at the time the agent acted to incapacitate himself or failed to 
prevent his incapacitation. We might think that at least some cases of agents such as Max 
and Arsenault are like this. Further, that the tracing account must address these sorts of con-
cerns does not give the ordinary-responsibility account any advantage, since that account 
must address the same sorts of concerns. Foreseeability and control matter for the ordinary-
responsibility account’s notion of responsibility for consequences. Responsibility for conse-
quences is how King hopes to explain the responsibility of the culpably incapacitated actor, 
and so rejecting tracing does not sidestep these problems, which are really questions for ac-
counts of responsibility more broadly. The skeptics’ better argument is the explanatory-
adequacy argument. 
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2. Tracing and the Odysseus Cases 
 
2.1  
 
The tracing advocate needs to identify a substantive difference between the 
tracing account and the ordinary-responsibility account. Start by considering 
the formal differences. We can identify (at least) two sorts of responsibility 
that are formally distinguished by their objects – action responsibility and 
consequence responsibility – though this does not yet require that there be 
any substantive difference tracking this formal difference. The ordinary-
responsibility account holds the culpably incapacitated agent responsible for 
the original incapacitating act A1 as a bit of action11 and for the culpably in-
capacitated act A2 and any further harms (H) as consequences of the original 
incapacitating act: 
 
Ordinary Responsibility: ! !! + !!!!{!!,!} 
 
The tracing account adds to ordinary responsibility that the culpably incapac-
itated agent is also responsible for the incapacitated action by virtue of trac-
ing: 
 
Tracing Responsibility: ! !! + !!!! !!,! + !! !!  
 
But we should remember that the tracing account’s extension of tracing re-
sponsibility is supposed to supplement ordinary responsibility’s account of 
responsibility for action. That means that tracing allows us to hold the agent 
responsible for both the original and the later actions qua actions, both with 
their concomitant consequences: 
 
Tracing Responsibility: ! !! + !!!! !!,! + !! !! + !!!!{!} 
 
We can see that there are two formal differences between ordinary responsi-
bility and tracing responsibility: (a) tracing duplicates some of the ordinary 
responsibility’s objects of responsibility, since A2 and H each appear twice in 
tracing’s accounting of responsibility, and (b) tracing, but not ordinary re-
sponsibility, allows us to hold the agent responsible for A2, the culpably in-
capacitated action, as an action instead of only as a consequence. 
Does the duplication matter?12 It is hard to decide this without first de-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 I set aside any distinction between actions and omissions here, recognizing that responsi-
bility for omissions presents a rich set of questions. The important distinction for consider-
ing tracing is that between actions and consequences. 
12 An anonymous referee wondered whether the tracing advocate is committed to this dupli-
cation. Here we see the problem that the tracing advocate faces throughout. The tracing 
advocate needs to find a substantive difference between ordinary responsibility and tracing 
that is worth having. The duplication presents an apparent substantive difference. If the trac-
ing advocate finds some way to avoid the duplication, then the tracing advocate faces re-
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termining whether we are right to want tracing. Suppose that the duplication 
leads to increased blame. If tracing’s duplication leads to excessive blame, 
then that tells against tracing. But if it is true that tracing is an appropriate 
addition to the reasons-responsiveness scheme, then tracing’s duplication 
leads to the right degree of blame in the culpable-incapacity cases, and it is 
ordinary responsibility that has got things wrong, letting the culpably inca-
pacitated agents off too leniently. And even this line of thinking takes as a 
given that the elements appearing twice heightens the degree of blame war-
ranted, but that is an open, substantive question. So the mere fact of formal 
duplication does not tell against tracing.  
My argument focuses instead on the second formal difference. Unlike 
ordinary responsibility, tracing allows us to hold the agent responsible for the 
culpably incapacitated action both as a consequence of the incapacitating ac-
tion and as an action in its own right. But this formal difference matters only 
if there is a concomitant substantive difference between action responsibility 
and consequence responsibility. It is nearly axiomatic that being responsible 
for doing wrong can make an otherwise blameless person blameworthy. It 
can be appropriate to resent someone who has done wrong on the basis of 
that wrongdoing, even if they have otherwise acted appropriately, and it can 
be appropriate to punish someone who has done wrong on the basis of that 
wrongdoing, even if they have otherwise acted appropriately.13 This exposure 
to blame is what it means to be accountable for a wrongful action. 
What about consequence responsibility? It seems uncontroversial that 
being responsible for a bad consequence matters. It can obligate an agent to 
make repair, and it can make it appropriate for an agent to feel a special sort 
of regret. Being responsible for a bad consequence can also matter for an 
agent’s blameworthiness, though this is more controversial.14 It can increase 
the degree of an otherwise-blameworthy agent’s blameworthiness, and it can 
change the scope of an agent’s blameworthiness. However, being responsible 
for a bad consequence cannot render an otherwise blameless person blame-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
newed pressure to find some alternative way to distinguish the tracing account from the or-
dinary-responsibility account. 
13 Actually, in both cases, it would be more accurate to say that we have something like a 
prima facie reason to resent or to punish, not an all-things-considered reason. For example, 
there might be reasons against resenting or punishing the blameworthy agent – perhaps the 
costs of resentment and punishment or the harms that might befall third parties – which 
make it the case that, while there is some reason to resent or to punish, all things considered 
it would be best not to. I set that difference aside here. 
14 Responsibility for bad consequences can matter for blameworthiness even if we reject 
resultant moral luck. As Michael Zimmerman (2002) explains, rejecting resultant moral luck 
does not mean that consequences become wholly irrelevant. Even if we set aside any possi-
ble import for blame, being responsible for consequences can have other normative import. 
Moreover, rejecting resultant moral luck is controversial, and many reasons-responsiveness 
theorists accept resultant moral luck. Fischer and Ravizza, for instance, have an extended 
treatment of the conditions of responsibility for consequences. And it is common to see the 
criminal law as accepting resultant moral luck, punishing completed crimes more harshly 
than merely attempted crimes. 
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worthy. It would be inappropriate to resent someone who has done nothing 
wrong, even if they have caused harm. That is, responsibility for consequenc-
es can affect the degree or scope of blameworthiness, but it cannot by itself 
affect the fact of blameworthiness. Only responsibility for a wrongdoing as 
an action can affect the fact of blameworthiness. 
Consider a surgeon who performs a risky but appropriate surgery. All 
surgeries carry the risk that something will go wrong, even if the surgeon 
takes all appropriate precautions and makes no mistakes. Sometimes things 
just do not work out. Imagine a surgeon who performs a consented-to, war-
ranted surgery competently, and yet the surgery results in disaster for the pa-
tient, even the patient’s death. The death was a foreseeable result of the sur-
geon’s behavior in performing the surgery, and the surgeon was responsible 
for her behavior in performing the surgery. So, in some sense, the surgeon 
might be responsible for the patient’s death. However, the surgeon is not 
responsible in the accountability sense of moral responsibility. Intuitively, the 
surgeon is not blameworthy for the patient’s death. It would be appropriate 
for the surgeon to feel a special sort of regret for being involved with the pa-
tient’s death, and it might be appropriate for the surgeon to make some ef-
fort at repair or amends, perhaps toward the patient’s family. But it would be 
inappropriate to blame, resent, or punish the surgeon. By contrast, consider a 
surgeon who performs a risky and inappropriate surgery. Luckily, the surgery 
is a success. Nonetheless, it seems appropriate for us to blame the surgeon. It 
is wrong to perform an inappropriate surgery. Being responsible for the 
wrongdoing is sufficient to expose the surgeon to blame, even if there are no 
further harms. 
To reprise, one formal difference between tracing responsibility and 
ordinary responsibility is that tracing responsibility allows us to hold the cul-
pably incapacitated agent responsible for the culpably incapacitated wrongdo-
ing both as a consequence and as an action, whereas ordinary responsibility 
only allows us to hold the culpably incapacitated agent responsible for the 
culpably incapacitated wrongdoing as a consequence. But to meaningfully 
distinguish the two accounts, we need to identify a substantive difference 
tracking that formal difference. Since action responsibility can ground 
blameworthiness for otherwise innocent agents, tracing (but not ordinary 
responsibility) makes foreseeable incapacitated behavior sufficient to hold an 
otherwise blameless agent blameworthy. This creates the possibility of an 
extensional difference between ordinary responsibility and tracing responsi-
bility. Next, I argue that tracing responsibility gets things wrong. 
 
2.2 
 
Recall Odysseus’ encounter with the Sirens. Odysseus and his men were to 
sail past the Sirens on their return to Ithaca. Circe had warned Odysseus that 
anyone hearing the Sirens’ song would be maddened by a desire to stay, nev-
er to return home. Odysseus had his men stuff their ears with wax. But 
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Odysseus, wanting to hear the Sirens’ song, had his men bind him to the 
ship’s mast instead. When Odysseus and his men approached the Sirens, 
Odysseus heard their song, and he was filled with desire to stay with the Si-
rens. But he was bound to the mast, incapacitated, and his men would not 
unbind him, so he could not act upon his desire. Odysseus and his men 
passed safely. 
Or consider a case Derek Parfit (1987) developed from Thomas Schel-
ling’s The Strategy of Conflict (1980). In that case, an armed robber threatens to 
kill an agent’s children unless the agent unlocks a gold-filled safe. The agent 
knows that it would be irrational to provide the gold (since then the armed 
robber would kill the agent and her children to stop them from reporting the 
crime), and she also knows that it would be irrational to ignore the threat 
(since that would risk the robber killing one of the children to spur the agent 
to action). The best choice is to take a drug, “conveniently at hand,” which 
would render the agent irrational. The agent’s irrationality would leave the 
armed robber’s threats ineffective, since the irrational agent would no longer 
be moved by concern for her children. The armed robber would hopefully 
recognize that and decide that his best remaining option would be to escape 
(presumably without harming the agent or her children, perhaps to minimize 
his criminal exposure). As Parfit acknowledges, there is a risk that the irra-
tional agent would harm herself or her children during the period of her irra-
tionality. But Parfit contends that it is still appropriate for the agent to cause 
herself to become irrational, since that risk is outweighed by the need to de-
fuse the armed robber’s threats. As Parfit explains, “On any plausible theory 
about rationality, it would be rational for me, in this case, to cause myself to 
become for a period irrational” (1987: 13). 
In Odysseus’ case and in Parfit’s rational-irrationality case, the agents 
use their compromised agency as a tool. Both agents solve some problem – 
how to experience the beauty of the Sirens’ song without becoming its vic-
tim, and how to defuse the invader’s threat – by giving up control. Although 
giving up control was risky, since things could have worked out poorly, the 
risk was justified.15 And because both agents purposefully brought about their 
own incapacity, it was foreseeable to both agents that their behavior would 
lead to their incapacity.16 Both Odysseus and Parfit’s parent acted: a) compe-
tently, b) in a way that foreseeably led to the agent’s own risky incapacitation, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Or, perhaps more accurately, the cases are presented to us as cases in which we are sup-
posed to take the risk to be justified. Odysseus is supposed to be a hero, and his cleverness is 
supposed to be his virtue. Some modern readers might find themselves less impressed with 
his willingness to risk the lives of those loyal to him. And some readers might likewise be 
unconvinced of Parfit’s parent’s assessment of the relative risks involved. Even if skeptical 
readers doubt these particular cases, they should be able to discern the pattern involved and 
imagine their own cases, perhaps even more fanciful, and I will shortly present more quotid-
ian Odysseus cases. 
16 For both of these agents, risky incapacity was a tool used to achieve some goal. But this is 
not the key fact. We could imagine an Odysseus agent for whom the incapacity is a foresee-
able side effect. 
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and yet c) morally appropriately. Call such cases Odysseus cases. Odysseus 
agents act in a way that foreseeably (and sometimes purposefully) leads to 
their own incapacitation, and they do so while they are competent. Accord-
ingly, they are responsible for incapacitating themselves. Unlike the culpable-
incapacity cases, however, the Odysseus agents are not blameworthy for in-
capacitating themselves. 
Homer’s and Parfit’s cases are fantastic and fictional. But there are also 
ordinary Odysseus cases. Going to sleep presents an Odysseus case. Being 
asleep is risky. The sleeping agent is unaware of his surroundings, unaware of 
risks that might present themselves, and unable to react. But, at least in nor-
mal circumstances, those risks are slight and outweighed by the benefits of 
sleep. Similarly, becoming medically incapacitated is risky. Being sedated or 
anesthetized entails giving up control, and that presents some risk. However, 
anesthetic and sedation are important and valuable elements of modern med-
icine, and the risks they present are usually outweighed by the benefits they 
offer. These agents who tie themselves to masts, take irrationality pills, go to 
sleep, take sedatives, or the like willingly incapacitate themselves, but they do 
not do so culpably. So Odysseus cases are a feature of our ordinary lives, not 
merely a philosopher’s construction. 
 
2.3 
 
The test case we need to distinguish tracing from ordinary responsibility is a 
special sort of Odysseus case. In addition to the incapacitation’s being non-
culpable, two further conditions must be met. First, unlike Odysseus himself, 
whose incapacitation was external, the test agent’s incapacitation should be 
internal, arising because the agent’s normative capacities are compromised. It 
is easy enough to imagine some medications working this way, such as Par-
fit’s convenient pill or the physician’s sedative. Second, again unlike in Odys-
seus’ case, things have to work out poorly. In particular, there has to be some 
second bit of behavior, occurring during the incapacity, that is wrongful be-
havior.17 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 The tracing account extends action responsibility to the later behavior. Extending action 
responsibility (and not merely consequence responsibility) matters for blaming only when-
the later behavior is wrongdoing. So, to contrast the tracing account and the ordinary-
responsibility account, it is important that the second bit of behavior be wrongful behavior. 
In this paper, I am agnostic as to the conditions of behavior’s being wrongful. However, it is 
plausible that wrongful behavior requires the possession of certain mental states, and it 
might be that some of the conditions that mar responsibility also sometimes preclude 
wrongfulness. For instance, recall the example of the intoxicated burglar from n. 7, where I 
explained that if the intoxication made it impossible for the agent to form the requisite inten-
tion, the agent did not commit burglary. Set aside those cases, and focus on cases in which 
an incapacitated agent can still act wrongfully. 
This limitation marks a significant difference between culpable incapacity and culpa-
ble ignorance. The ultimate behavior in the culpable-incapacity cases is wrongdoing, and we 
are asking whether to hold the agent responsible. On a common understanding, the ultimate 
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We can imagine this sort of case by modifying the case of Parfit’s self-
incapacitated parent. Imagine that the robber behaves as expected, reacting 
to the parent’s irrationality by making his escape. It takes some time, howev-
er, for the drug to wear off. In the meantime, the parent irrationally but pur-
posefully – and therefore wrongfully – harms her children. Is she blamewor-
thy for that wrongdoing?  
Or consider a more ordinary case. Imagine a surgery patient, recover-
ing from a desperately needed surgery, slowly emerging from the grip of a 
powerful anesthetic. Awake but still quite drugged, the patient mistreats the 
attending nurses, making repeated rude, impatient, and insulting demands. 
Because the anesthesia was a necessary element of a necessary surgery, the 
patient was properly incapacitated, even knowing that there was a good 
chance the patient would act impulsively while recovering from the anesthet-
ic. In fact, the hospital requires its patients to remain under observation for a 
substantial period after surgery exactly because of the anesthetic’s effects on 
appropriate judgment. Many times patients remain asleep throughout that 
period, but in this case the patient awoke and acted wrongly. Is the patient 
responsible for that wrongdoing? 
Ordinary responsibility would not render these agents blameworthy. 
Because their incapacitating actions were justified, there is no blame to be 
had there. What about the incapacitated wrongdoings? These unlucky Odys-
seus agents are incapacitated when they act wrongfully. Because reasons-
responsiveness is a necessary condition of responsibility for wrongdoing un-
der the ordinary-responsibility scheme, the agents are not responsible for 
their wrongdoings as a bit of action. The wrongful behaviors were foreseea-
ble in light of the agents’ earlier actions in becoming incapacitated, and so 
they might be held responsible for the wrongdoings as consequences. 18 
Hence, it might be that they should feel regret, make amends, or the like. 
However, as consequences, the incapacitated, wrongful behaviors cannot 
render the otherwise-blameless agents blameworthy. 
Contrast this with tracing responsibility. Because the incapacitated 
wrongdoings were the foreseeable upshots of the agents’ earlier behaviors, 
we trace responsibility for the incapacitated wrongdoings back to the agent’s 
responsibility for their incapacitating actions. Tracing thus holds the agents 
responsible for their incapacitated wrongdoings as actions. Since the agents !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
behavior in the culpable-ignorance cases is not ordinary wrongdoing, precisely because the 
agent is ignorant of some fact that bears on the behavior’s inappropriateness, and we are 
asking whether to treat the behavior as wrongdoing nonetheless. For a clear treatment of 
culpable ignorance invoking a distinction parallel to that between the ordinary-responsibility 
account and the tracing account, see Holly Smith’s “Culpable Ignorance” (1983). 
18 It might seem strange that it is true both that the later, wrongful behavior was a foreseea-
ble consequence of the agent’s earlier behavior and that the agent’s earlier behavior was not 
wrongdoing. However, there is nothing improper about this. Lots of behavior runs risks, and 
so long as we think that some risks can be justified, there is room to think that a bit of be-
havior might not be wrong even when it results in a bad outcome. Why would anything 
change about this just because the bad outcome involves a risked bit of wrongdoing? 
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would thus be responsible for a bit of wrongdoing, the tracing account en-
tails that the agents are blameworthy. 
By considering Odysseus cases, I have identified cases in which ordi-
nary responsibility and tracing responsibility disagree about whether an agent 
is blameworthy. The tracing account holds unlucky Odysseus agents blame-
worthy, and the ordinary-responsibility account does not. Between the two, 
the ordinary-responsibility account offers the more attractive verdict. Intui-
tively, the unlucky Odysseus agents are not blameworthy. When I imagine 
the modified Parfit case, for instance, I lack the intuition that the parent is 
blameworthy, and I lack the related intuition that she could appropriately be 
punished. Instead, intuitively, she seems unlucky. It is easy to imagine the 
parent feeling regret, and it is easy to imagine thinking poorly of her if she 
does not feel that regret or if she fails to make an effort to address the harms 
she has caused. And I could imagine feeling terrible for the parent who 
harmed her own child. But she does not seem blameworthy. I feel sympathy, 
not resentment, toward the parent. 
These intuitions comport with thinking of responsibility as tracking the 
fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. Imagine holding the parent blamewor-
thy. You can imagine her asking what she should have done differently. 
Should she have refrained from taking the drug, thereby exposing herself and 
her family to the robber’s threats? Given the options available, she had no 
fair opportunity to avoid the risk of the wrongdoing, and so she did not have 
a fair opportunity to avoid the wrongdoing. Contrast this with the culpable-
incapacity cases in the tracing literature, in which the agent did have a fair 
opportunity to avoid the wrongdoing. The drunk driver, for instance, had the 
fair opportunity to avoid the wrongdoing when the drunk driver had the op-
portunity not to become intoxicated to the point of incapacity. It is ordinarily 
fair to ask someone not to drink to incapacitation. 
In the Odysseus cases, ordinary responsibility gets the verdicts right, 
and tracing responsibility gets the verdicts wrong. That and ordinary respon-
sibility’s ability to ground blame in the original culpable-incapacity cases give 
us sufficient reason to reject tracing and stick with ordinary responsibility. 
 
2.4 
 
The Odysseus cases pose a problem for the tracing account because the trac-
ing advocate appears committed to three propositions: 1) tracing extends re-
sponsibility in cases of responsible but non-culpable incapacity, 2) tracing 
extends action responsibility in particular, and 3) being action responsible for 
a bit of wrongdoing is sufficient for blameworthiness. If those three proposi-
tions are true, then the tracing advocate is committed to holding the Odys-
seus agents blameworthy, and that tells against tracing. So could a defender 
of tracing not fend off my attack by denying one of those three propositions? 
Why not, for instance, limit tracing only to cases of culpable incapacity?  
The problem for the tracing advocate is not just that any such limita-
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tions appear ad hoc. The problem is that the tracing advocate can appeal to 
these responses only at the cost of making the tracing account substantively 
indistinguishable from the ordinary-responsibility account, and that would be 
to abandon a substantive account of tracing. If the tracing advocate rejects 
one of these three propositions, then she will run into the strongest version 
of the objection suggested by skeptics like Alexander, Khoury, and King, that 
ordinary responsibility gives us everything that tracing gives us. 
Start with the possibility of limiting tracing only to cases of culpable 
incapacity. Tracing’s advocates do not permit tracing in all cases of incapaci-
ty. For example, Fischer and Ravizza point to Roger O. Thornhill, Cary 
Grant’s character in North by Northwest, who is forced to drink bourbon when 
his enemies want to stage a driving accident. Although Thornhill drives while 
intoxicated, he is not responsible for his behavior, because he is not respon-
sible for becoming intoxicated. There is no responsibility to trace back to, 
and so Fischer and Ravizza limit tracing to cases of responsible incapacity. 
It might seem natural to strengthen the restriction and limit tracing’s 
extension of responsibility to cases in which the agent was not just responsi-
ble but also blameworthy for her underlying incapacity. Were tracing’s appli-
cation restricted in this way, tracing would not extend responsibility in the 
Odysseus cases because the underlying incapacitation is not blameworthy in 
those cases.19 
But the tracing advocate faces a dilemma here. The tracing advocate 
does avoid the threat of the Odysseus cases by restricting tracing only to cas-
es in which the underlying incapacity is culpable. But, in doing so, the tracing 
advocate makes tracing duplicative of ordinary responsibility. Even without 
tracing, the ordinary-responsibility account can explain why the consequenc-
es of an agent’s culpable incapacity can heighten her blame, obligate her to 
make repair, and the like. What is left for the traced responsibility to do in 
such a case? If tracing is limited only to cases of culpable incapacity, then it 
adds nothing to the ordinary-responsibility account. 
The tracing advocate will face the same objection if he attempts to 
avoid the threat of the Odysseus cases by denying my dialectical presumption 
that tracing extends action responsibility. Although the tracing advocates 
suggest that tracing is intended to supplement action responsibility, the con-
ditions of extending tracing responsibility – control at some earlier point 
when the later wrongdoing is foreseeable – parallel the conditions required !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19!We might think of this limitation in inheritance terms. Because the traced responsibility is 
rooted in the responsibility for the underlying incapacity, it might not be surprising if the 
traced responsibility inherited some of the features of the underlying incapacity. In the 
Odysseus cases, the underlying incapacitation is justified. It might seem natural in those cas-
es to think that the traced responsibility would inherit the normative effect of the justifica-
tion of the underlying incapacitation. And if that’s so, then the tracing does not extend 
blameworthiness-grounding responsibility. I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out 
that this response can be thought of in inheritance terms. !
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for holding an agent responsible for a consequence. And if we understand 
tracing as extending consequence responsibility instead of action responsibil-
ity, then the Odysseus cases pose no problem. Mere consequence responsi-
bility cannot render an otherwise blameless agent blameworthy, and so if on-
ly consequence responsibility is extended, the Odysseus agents will not be 
exposed to blameworthiness. If the tracing advocate appeals to this response, 
however, tracing becomes substantively indistinguishable from ordinary re-
sponsibility. Even without tracing, ordinary responsibility can explain why 
the culpably incapacitated agent is blameworthy for the consequences of her 
responsible agency. If tracing does no more than extend consequence re-
sponsibility, then it adds nothing new to the ordinary-responsibility account.  
Could the tracing advocate deny that being action responsible for 
wrongdoing grounds blameworthiness? If being responsible in this way for 
wrongdoing is not sufficient for blameworthiness, then there is room to hold 
the Odysseus agents responsible for their wrongdoing without holding them 
blameworthy. This strategy requires the tracing advocate to take a controver-
sial stand on a foundational question about moral responsibility, and that 
should make this the least-tempting distinction of the three. I suggested that 
it is nearly axiomatic that an agent’s being blameworthy is entailed by her be-
ing responsible for a wrongdoing as an action. But not everyone accepts that 
responsibility for wrongdoing is sufficient for blameworthiness. For example, 
in a discussion with Derk Pereboom, Fischer writes, “It is crucial here to 
keep in mind the distinction between moral responsibility and (say) moral 
blameworthiness (or praiseworthiness)” (2004: 157). Fischer explains that an 
agent’s history – things like manipulation – could make it inappropriate to 
hold a responsible wrongdoer blameworthy. And Michael McKenna (2012) 
argues that reasons-responsiveness and wrongdoing alone are not sufficient 
for blameworthiness; he requires the satisfaction of a quality-of-will condi-
tion in addition. Of course, it might be that Fischer’s concern about manipu-
lation and McKenna’s concern about quality of will are best understood as 
telling against responsibility, and only thereby against blameworthiness. In 
any case, these particular constraints will not help the tracing advocate. There 
is no reason to think that all Odysseus agents are manipulated agents, and it 
is easy enough to imagine Odysseus agents who might satisfy a quality-of-will 
condition at the time of the incapacitated wrongdoing. Nonetheless, we can 
see the conceptual possibility that responsibility for wrongdoing might not be 
sufficient for blameworthiness.  
The tracing advocate here faces the same bind he faced elsewhere. In 
order to defend a substantive tracing account, the tracing advocate needs to 
identify some significant difference between tracing responsibility and ordi-
nary responsibility. I have identified one plausible difference between tracing 
responsibility and ordinary responsibility, but accepting that difference tells 
against tracing. If the tracing advocate therefore denies that action responsi-
bility is a distinct type of responsibility (or, at least, is distinctive in the way I 
have suggested), then the tracing advocate has no grounds for holding that 
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the difference between action responsibility and consequence responsibility is 
more than merely formal. So the tracing advocate can deny that action re-
sponsibility is distinctive in this way only by abandoning the substantive trac-
ing account. 
This dooms tracing. The tracing advocate needs to show both that 
tracing makes a real difference and that we should want our theory of re-
sponsibility to accommodate that difference. However, the most promising 
way to distinguish the tracing account from the ordinary-responsibility ac-
count – understanding tracing as extending action responsibility – commits 
the tracing advocate to holding unlucky Odysseus agents responsible and 
therefore blameworthy. Since the unlucky Odysseus agents are intuitively not 
blameworthy, the tracing advocate can distinguish the tracing account from 
the ordinary-responsibility account only by rendering the tracing account ex-
tensionally inadequate. The only apparent ways to defuse the threat from the 
Odysseus cases amount to abandoning tracing as a substantive addition. Ac-
cordingly, the Odysseus cases tell us to reject tracing as a substantive addition 
to responsibility. 
Abandoning tracing as a substantive addition does not mean that there 
is no room for tracing in our thinking about moral responsibility. Even if 
tracing is not a substantive addition, it might yet serve as a helpful heuristic. 
Given the similarities between the conditions of applying tracing and the 
conditions of applying responsibility for consequences, we might charitably 
understand the arguments offered by the tracing advocates as intending to 
draw our attention to the role that responsibility for consequences can play in 
cases in which some of the consequences at issue are further actions. Indeed, 
philosophers working on other problems have not always treated the tracing 
account and the ordinary-responsibility account as distinctive accounts of 
responsibility. Neal Judisch (2005), for example, moves between Fischer and 
Ravizza’s tracing account and their account of responsibility for consequenc-
es in discussing a challenge to their taking-ownership condition. And consid-
er Vargas: “We hold someone responsible for the results of drunk driving, 
not because of the kind of agent they are when they get behind the wheel, 
but rather, because of the kind of agent they were when they started to 
drink” (2013: 273). This line of thinking allows that tracing might be an in-
stance of ordinary responsibility for consequences, not a distinctive sort of 
responsibility for wrongdoing. Noticing the importance of recognizing the 
cases in which an important consequence of our wrongdoing is some further 
wrongdoing would be an interesting result, though it would be a revision of 
the tracing advocates’ arguments, given their insistence that the addition of 
tracing makes a substantive difference. 
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3. Considering Three Objections 
 
I have argued that we do not need tracing to blame culpably incapacitated 
agents like the drunk driver, and I have argued that tracing threatens to hold 
blameworthy non-culpable agents like Parfit’s parent or the surgery patient. 
But tracing has been persistently attractive, and so here I consider three wor-
risome objections to abandoning tracing. 
First, tracing seems to make good the idea that no one should benefit 
from their own wrongdoing.20 Being permitted an excuse might seem good 
for the wrongdoer; the excuse enables the wrongdoer to avoid blame that 
might otherwise be appropriate. Incapacity is the sort of condition that can 
ground an excuse. However, the culpably incapacitated agent brings about 
his own incapacity, and he does so by acting wrongfully. Permitting the cul-
pably incapacitated agent to point to his own incapacitation as grounds for an 
excuse might then seem to violate the general principle against allowing 
wrongdoers to benefit from their wrongdoing. The culpably incapacitated 
agent would have garnered an ostensibly beneficial excuse, and he would 
have done so by acting wrongfully. At the extreme, allowing culpably inca-
pacitated agents an excuse for their culpably incapacitated wrongdoing might 
even seem to give wrongdoers a strategy for insulating themselves against 
recrimination. As the Maine court explained in Arsenault: 
 
[T]he defense of insanity should never be extended to apply to voluntary in-
toxication in a murder case. It would not only open wide the door to de-
fenses built on frauds and perjuries, but would build a broad, easy turnpike 
for escape. All that the crafty criminal would require for a well-planned 
murder, in Maine, would be a revolver in one hand to commit the deed, and 
a quart of intoxicating liquor in the other with which to build his excusable 
defense. 
 
Accepting tracing, and thereby refusing to grant the culpably incapacitated 
agent an excuse, can ensure that there is no “broad, easy turnpike for es-
cape.” 
We can set aside this worry. In order to know whether someone has 
benefited, we have to know what the relevant comparison is. In the culpable-
incapacity cases, the agent’s earlier, competent wrongdoing – the improper, 
self-incapacitating behavior – makes the agent more blameworthy than he 
otherwise would be. He is blameworthy for that initial behavior, and then he 
risks being blameworthy for further harms (including his later improper be-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 This general principle is a feature of American law familiar to many philosophers from 
Ronald Dworkin’s discussion of the New York case Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889) in 
Law’s Empire (1986). In that case, Elmer Palmer murdered his grandfather to ensure that the 
grandfather died before writing Palmer out of his will. As the court explained in ruling 
against Palmer, New York’s probate law was to be interpreted in light of the general princi-
ples within the law, including the principle against allowing wrongdoers to benefit from their 
wrongdoing. 
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havior) that result. That is significant blame that the agent could have avoid-
ed by not acting improperly from the outset. So the agent is not made better 
off by way of his wrongdoing (at least not in terms of escaping blame). Nor 
is the agent better off than someone who is involuntarily incapacitated. Both 
are similarly excused from action responsibility for their incapacitated 
wrongdoings, but only the culpably incapacitated agent is blameworthy for 
being incapacitated. Recognizing this, we can see both why tracing might 
have seemed attractive in this way and why we need not actually worry about 
it. 
Second, we might think tracing is appropriate because it seems to offer 
the best explanation of a comparative pattern of blaming we see in both or-
dinary morality and the law: We blame unlucky culpably incapacitated agents 
who commit some further wrongdoing more frequently and more harshly 
than we blame lucky culpably incapacitated agents. Consider again the drunk 
drivers. Drunk drivers, and especially drunk drivers who cause further harm, 
are exposed to significant and appropriate blame and punishment. What 
about agents who drink to the point of incapacity but then, luckily, neither 
drive while intoxicated nor cause any further harm? They are subjected to 
less frequent and less severe blame and punishment, both in ordinary morali-
ty and in the law. 
This comparative pattern – that drunk drivers are punished more often 
and more severely than the merely drunk – might suggest that culpably inca-
pacitated agents are being held responsible for their culpably incapacitated 
wrongdoing as a bit of action. Recall that it is responsibility for wrongdoing 
that is supposed to mark the difference between blameworthy and non-
blameworthy agents. Since the drunk drivers and the merely drunk alike 
drank to the point of incapacitation, and since the merely drunk sometimes 
appear not to be blamed, then it might appear that drinking to the point of 
incapacitation is not being treated as action. Hence, the wrongdoing that 
grounds the blameworthiness of the drunk drivers might seem to be their 
drunk driving. 
That we do blame those who commit vehicular homicide more than 
mere drunk drivers and mere drunk drivers more than mere drunks does not 
mean that we should blame in these ways. Our practices are not immune to 
criticism and revision. For instance, Khoury and Alexander suggest that it is 
our competent behavior that matters for blame, not whatever follows. And 
so perhaps we should be blaming those who kill less than we do, though we 
might still expect contrition, compensation, and the like from them. And 
probably we should blame those who culpably incapacitate themselves more 
than we do. After all, drinking to the point of incapacity is ordinarily danger-
ous behavior. People who are that intoxicated cause a whole range of harms, 
and drunk driving accidents are merely one such particularly deadly result.21 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 As an anonymous referee noted, drinking to intoxication need not always be reckless. For 
instance, it is possible to imagine someone who, prior to drinking to the point of incapacita-
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Even if, fortuitously, no further harm results, we should sanction that dan-
gerousness. And we might accept one of these latter conclusions without 
committing to Khoury and Alexander’s strict denial of resultant moral luck. 
If some such revisionary explanation is available, then the need to explain the 
extant comparative pattern is gone. 
And we could, like many, accept that the results of an agent’s behavior 
can affect the degree of appropriate blame. The results need not reflect any 
difference in the quality of the agent’s will nor any difference in the agent’s 
regard for others. However, the results of wrongdoing – risks imposed and 
harms suffered – can affect the interests of others. The culpable-incapacity 
cases often result in serious harms. Think of Hinckley, shot and killed by Ar-
senault, or think of the victims of drunk drivers. Their deaths are serious 
harms, and many accept that causing serious harms can render a blamewor-
thy agent significantly more blameworthy. And, as King suggests, even cul-
pably incapacitated agents whose further wrongdoing results in no additional 
harm – such as a drunk driver who fortuitously makes it home without inci-
dent – might be held accountable for the additional risk they have imposed, 
for the close call they created. If these harms and dangers can increase the 
degree of an agent’s blameworthiness, then the tracing skeptic can explain 
why we might hold the unlucky culpably incapacitated agent far more 
blameworthy than we hold the lucky culpably incapacitated agent. 
We can also explain why it might be appropriate to blame the drunk 
driver but not the agent who drinks to intoxication but luckily does not drive. 
We might conclude that, while both are blameworthy, it is only all-things-
considered appropriate to blame the drunk driver. We see something like this 
in cases of de minimis blameworthiness.22 Section 2.12(2) of the Model Penal 
Code, for instance, excuses behavior “too trivial to warrant the condemna-
tion of conviction.” The de minimis defense is an element of our criminal 
practices and almost certainly also of our moral practices. Why might this be? 
Blaming and punishment are not costless. It takes effort to identify blame-
worthy agents, and we risk blaming and punishing the innocent. Blaming and 
punishment impose costs – psychological, financial, interpersonal and other-
wise – on the blamer, on the punisher, and on third parties. These costs 
might be particularly unpalatable if the wrongdoing is fairly widespread. And 
so we might let some wrongdoings slide, though the agents involved are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
tion, takes precautions to preclude later incapacitated misbehavior, such as arranging for a 
designated driver, handing over the car keys, or the like. Whether these precautions are suffi-
cient to obviate the culpability for becoming intoxicated to the point of incapacity is not 
clear to me. However, it is true that it is possible for an agent to become intoxicated to the 
point of incapacity without thereby raising the sorts of risks that ordinarily render such be-
havior culpable. For such cautious agents, their incapacity would not be culpable, and we 
should not blame them, regardless of whether any harm results. 
22 What counts as de minimis wrongdoing and whether we should withhold blame in those 
cases are questions I do not fully address here. For more substantive treatments, see Husak 
(2010) and Stanislaw Pomorski (1997). 
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blameworthy. This means that we might blame drunk drivers even though we 
do not blame drunks, despite both being blameworthy. The costs of blaming 
might be worth paying in the case of drunk drivers, while the costs might be 
too high in the case of merely drunks. 
I do not here resolve which response the tracing skeptic should offer 
to address the comparative patterns in our punishing and blaming practices. 
However, plenty of philosophical resources can be brought to bear, from 
criticizing our extant practices to explaining them, none of which need trac-
ing. Since we can comfortably address those comparative patterns without 
appealing to tracing, they do not pressure us to accept tracing. 
Finally, rejecting tracing seems to suggest that incapacitated wrongdo-
ings are just ordinary harmful consequences. But surely this is wrong. Both 
we and the agent should see the incapacitated wrongdoing as more than 
merely some untoward event in which the agent played some causal role. If 
ordinary responsibility commands us to take this impoverished view of the 
relationship between the agent and the incapacitated wrongdoing, so much 
the worse for ordinary responsibility.23 
But this objection to tracing skepticism arises only if we are not careful 
to distinguish between the many different sorts of responsibility that might 
be at issue.24 As I have argued, the incapacitated agent is not responsible for 
the incapacitated action in a way that could ground blameworthiness. How-
ever, the agent can be responsible for the incapacitated action in other ways. 
We might ascribe responsibility to him in a way that permits us to make 
judgments about his character. For instance, we might think that the pill tak-
en by Parfit’s parent unleashed some improper impulse she otherwise would 
have restrained. She is not responsible for the incapacitated wrongdoing in 
the accountability sense, but we might make some judgment of her character 
because she harbored such an improper impulse at all. She is responsible for 
the wrongdoing in that sense, even if that is not the accountability sort of 
responsibility that could make her blameworthy. 
Likewise, the culpably incapacitated agent might be responsibility in a 
sense that makes it appropriate for the agent to feel regret and to make ef-
forts at repair. Think of the lorry driver in Bernard Williams’s Moral Luck 
(1981). The lorry driver faultlessly runs over a child, striking the child despite 
driving with due care. Though the lorry driver, by hypothesis, has done noth-
ing wrong, we expect the lorry driver to feel a special sort of regret, and we !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 I thank an anonymous referee for raising this objection forcefully. This objection invites 
tracing’s advocates to say more about the boundaries of the reactions that accountability 
licenses, a rich area for further discussion.  
24 There is a significant literature on the many kinds of responsibility that might be at stake, 
from Watson’s seminal “Two Faces of Responsibility” (1996) (which yields talk of attributa-
bility and accountability) to Fischer and Tognazzini’s recent “The Physiognomy of Respon-
sibility” (2011b) (where they identify a number of different attributability questions, a num-
ber of different accountability questions, and matters of responsibility that lie between the 
two). 
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may also think it appropriate for the driver to compensate for the harm 
caused. In the culpable-incapacity cases, the grounds for regret and compen-
sation should be at least as strong. Williams’s lorry driver bears only causal 
responsibility for striking the child. Fischer and Ravizza’s drunk driver also 
bears causal responsibility for the harm caused; however, unlike Williams’ 
lorry driver, Fischer and Ravizza’s drunk driver is not faultless. And so just as 
it would be inapt for the lorry driver to think no more of the harm he caused 
than that it was something that happened merely in or through him, it would 
surely be inapt for the drunk driver to have such thoughts. 
Non-blame reactions like regret deserve greater philosophical atten-
tion. However, we should distinguish them from the guilt and indignation 
that the reasons-responsiveness theorists and the tracing advocates take to 
mark accountability and blameworthiness. If we are not careful to distinguish 
the ways in which agents can be responsible, we might think culpably inca-
pacitated agents are responsible simpliciter for the incapacitated wrongdoing. 
That could make us think we need tracing to account for culpably incapaci-
tated agents’ responsibility, and this would return us to worries about non-
culpably incapacitated agents’ responsibility – the Odysseus case objection. If 
we are careful to distinguish between the various sorts of responsibility at 
issue, however, we can see that tracing is not needed. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Tracing’s advocates contend that the reasons-responsiveness account of 
moral responsibility needs to be augmented to account for the blameworthi-
ness of culpably incapacitated agents. However, the ordinary-responsibility 
account can give us the right explanation in those cases: The culpably inca-
pacitated agents are blameworthy for culpably incapacitating themselves. As 
other tracing skeptics have suggested, this defuses one motivation for adding 
tracing, that ordinary responsibility initially appeared to be explanatorily inad-
equate. 
Defusing that motive, however, does not tell us that tracing gets things 
wrong. To show that tracing is wrong, I have offered a new argument against 
tracing. The addition of tracing is typically motivated by looking at cases of 
culpable incapacity, but I have challenged tracing by pointing to cases of 
non-culpable incapacity, the Odysseus cases. Tracing gets those cases wrong, 
and ordinary responsibility gets them right. This gives us reason to reject the 
addition of tracing to the ordinary-responsibility account. And I have sup-
plemented that argument against tracing by offering explanations for trac-
ing’s continued popularity, showing how we might have been misled into 
thinking tracing attractive. 
Rejecting tracing is no small matter. Tracing bifurcated the conditions 
of action responsibility, rendering an agent responsible if either the reasons-
responsiveness conditions were met immediately or the tracing conditions 
were met historically. Rejecting tracing permits us to maintain a univocal 
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condition of action responsibility. And, by rejecting tracing, we eliminate one 
historical element of the analysis of responsibility. Without tracing, contem-
poraneous reasons-responsiveness is a necessary condition of responsibility. 
This is one step toward ascertaining just how and when an agent’s history can 
be relevant to their responsibility for some particular bit of action.  
Rejecting tracing also allows us to treat a central sort of criminal 
wrongdoing more honestly. It might have seemed that tracing was only an 
exceptional sort of responsibility. However, intoxication is involved in a tre-
mendous proportion of violent crimes. If so many of our most serious 
crimes involve some degree of culpable incapacitation, it is important that we 
get the analysis of culpability in those cases correct. So without tracing, what 
should we say about intoxicated wrongdoers like Max and Arsenault? In an-
swering that question, we will have to wrestle with difficult questions about 
partial responsibility, about foreseeability, and about just how risky and im-
proper self-incapacitation is. Not all self-incapacitation, not even all intoxica-
tion, is alike. Perhaps there is a significant difference between the sort of 
drinking that agents such as Arsenault have engaged in – drinking far to ex-
cess, and in dangerous conditions – and the sort of social drinking that is 
widespread in our society. Does that difference lead to a difference in culpa-
bility? What are we to say about social drinking that unluckily leads to inca-
pacitated wrongdoing? Given the prevalence of the behavior and the stakes 
of the harm involved, these pressing questions need philosophical investiga-
tion.25 
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25 I have received invaluable feedback from many people on this and earlier drafts. I would 
particularly like to thank Saba Bazargan, Amy Berg, David Brink, Jeremy Dickinson, Stephen 
Galoob, Joyce Havstad, Gil Hersch, Matt King, Alexandre Marcellesi, Michael McKenna, 
Per Milam, Dana Nelkin, Ben Sheredos, Michael Tiboris, and Danny Weltman. I would also 
like to thank the attendees of a talk based upon an earlier version of this paper at the 2014 
Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association as well as several anon-
ymous referees. Finally, I would like to thank the editorial staff of the Journal of Ethics & So-
cial Philosophy for patient assistance in preparing this article for publication. 
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